




IS IT TIME TO FUNCTIONALLY DISPATCH WITH THE SOCIAL 
TOLERANCE PRONG OF THE ETS EXPOSURE CLAIMS? 
John J. Rolecki* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is now clearly established that the deleterious effect of second-
hand smoke is a matter of public interest and concern.1  Since the re-
lease of the 1986 United States Surgeon General’s report detailing 
the harms of smoking, state and local legislatures have been quite ac-
tive in creating measures to control secondhand smoke and protect 
the rights of non-smokers in society.2  In 1993, the United States Su-
preme Court made the unprecedented decision to consider a prison-
er’s extreme exposure to secondhand smoke unconstitutional as 
cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment of the Constitution.3  This landmark ruling of Helling v. McKin-
ney recognized a theory of harm beyond that with which the Eighth 
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 1 See Patrick Kabat, Note, “Till Naught but Ash Is Left To See”:  Statewide Smoking Bans, Ballot 
Initiatives, and the Public Sphere, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 128, 130 (2009) (not-
ing the increase in smoking regulations in the past millennium); see also Ctrs. for Disease 
Control & Prevention, Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Produc-
tivity Losses—United States, 2000–2004, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., 1226, 1226 
(2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5745.pdf (analyzing the 
mortality rates, years of potential life lost, and productivity losses resulting from smok-
ing); Fact Sheet:  Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (Jan. 1993), http://www.epa.gov/smokefree/pubs/etsfs.html (concluding “that 
the widespread exposure to environmental tobacco smoke in the U.S. present a serious 
and substantial public health risk”); Secondhand Smoke, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION,   http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_
smoke/general_facts/index.htm (last visited May 11, 2011) (discussing the health effects 
of secondhand smoke). 
 2 E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
INVOLUNTARY SMOKING:  A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986); see also Kabat, supra 
note 1 (presenting a survey of current legislation intended to curb public smoking). 
 3 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). 
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Amendment typically dealt.4  With this ruling, the Court extended 
Eighth Amendment protection to a situation where the plaintiff—a 
prisoner—neither lacked basic human necessities nor sustained posi-
tive present injury, or even certain future harm.5  Commentators have 
regarded the ruling as the Court’s acceptance of secondhand smoke 
as a serious health concern, as well as a signal to legislatures to regu-
late prison atmospheres accordingly.6 
Eighteen years have passed since Helling came down from the Su-
preme Court.  In the interim, the scientific and social consensus that 
environmental tobacco smoke (“ETS”) is positively harmful has crys-
tallized.7  It is no longer legitimate to argue, as did the United States 
in its Helling amicus brief, that ETS exposure should not constitute 
harm because “[s]moking is widespread in society, and millions of 
people are exposed to its secondary effects on a daily basis.”8  Accor-
dingly, some commentators have called for a minimum standard of 
 
 4 See Jacqueline M. Kane, Note, You’ve Come a Long Way, Felon:  Helling v. McKinney Extends 
the Eighth Amendment to Grant Prisoners the Exclusive Constitutional Right to a Smoke-Free Envi-
ronment, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (1994) (discussing how Helling held that future health 
risks can comprise an Eighth Amendment claim). 
 5 Cf. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (declaring excessive force against prisoner 
as definitively falling under Eighth Amendment protection); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 
U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (determining Eighth Amendment applicable to deprivations of “es-
sential food, medical care, or sanitation”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–106 (1976) 
(finding Eighth Amendment violation when basic medical care was withheld from pris-
oner). 
 6 See, e.g., Matthew H. Kraft, Note, Second Hand Smoke as Cruel and Unusual Punishment:  Hel-
ling v. McKinney:  The Insurmountable Burden of Proof and the Role of the Court, 3 GEO. 
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 257, 278–79 (1994) (stressing the Court’s standard as flexible and 
cautious in the face of scientific uncertainty and societal divide). 
 7 See, e.g., IRA J. CHASNOFF & JEFFREY LINK, AM. MED. ASS’N, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO 
SMOKE:  OFFICE-BASED STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION (2008), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/433/environmental-tobacco-
smoke.pdf (setting forth in pamphlet form a set of goals for clinicians pertaining to ETS, 
including increasing physician knowledge and awareness, as well as direction on how to 
counsel patients and families on tobacco exposure reduction); WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
PROTECTION FROM EXPOSURE TO SECOND-HAND TOBACCO SMOKE 2 (2007), available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2007/9789241563413_eng.pdf (prescribing a 
comprehensive set of policy recommendations for achieving smoke-free environments).  
See generally The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke:  A Report of the 
Surgeon General, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL (June 27, 2006), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/secondhandsmoke/ 
(containing full 2006 Surgeon General’s Report, as well as extensive links to information 
on the dangers of secondhand smoke). 
 8 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Helling v. 
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (No. 91–1958), 1992 WL 12012062. 
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air quality for prisons.9  Our heightened knowledge of the effects of 
ETS has led to some dissatisfaction concerning Helling’s approach to 
determining whether ETS exposure in a prison constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.10 
In accordance with traditional Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
the Helling test has subjective and objective components.  Subjective-
ly, the plaintiff must show that authorities were deliberately indiffe-
rent to the harm being sustained;11 this Comment does not deal with 
this aspect of the Helling test.  Objectively, the plaintiff must show that 
he is sustaining unreasonable and scientifically cognizable harm.12  
Beyond an objective, scientific determination of sustained harm, 
however, the test further requires a determination of the extent of 
ETS exposure tolerated by society and subsequently an analysis of the 
plaintiff’s sustained exposure relative to that benchmark of societal 
ETS tolerance.13  This Comment argues that the social tolerance in-
quiry of the Helling test, though consistent with Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, is unethical and legally inefficient in light of current 
knowledge of the harms of ETS exposure.  Once a plaintiff establish-
es the occurrence of scientifically unreasonable exposure, the right of 
a prisoner to be free from unreasonable ETS exposure should not 
turn on a litigated conception of what level of ETS exposure society 
would choose to tolerate.  By merging the objective harm and social 
tolerance inquiries and assuming, justifiably, that society would not 
tolerate anyone being forcibly subjected to a scientifically dangerous 
level of ETS, courts would recognize the recent shift to a presump-
tively ETS-intolerant society.  Further, such a merger would obviate 
the necessity of relying upon a diffuse third party’s opinion to deter-
mine the appropriate air standards for a given prisoner.  Beyond 
yielding conceptual and ethical dividends, the changed approach to 
 
 9 See Scott C. Wilcox, Note, Secondhand Smoke Signals from Prison, 105 MICH. L. REV. 2081, 
2101 (2007) (suggesting judicial and legislative remedies for Eighth Amendment viola-
tions). 
 10 See Kraft, supra note 6, at 272–79 (noting the scarcity of research on ETS in 1994 and the 
resultantly "insurmountable" standard of proof for prisoners); see also Elizabeth Alexan-
der & David C. Fathi, Smoking, the Perception of Risk, and the Eighth Amendment, 13 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 691, 692–93, 704 (1994) (analyzing the creation of the social tolerance 
prong in Helling and labeling it a "pyrrhic victory for prisoners"); Wilcox, supra note 9 at 
2094-97 (prescribing proper approach to the Helling standard in light of current re-
search and attitudes regarding ETS).  Wilcox approves of Helling (as do I), but shows 
concern for updating the mode of the application of its standard due to shifting social 
views and improved research data. 
 11 Helling, 509 U.S. at 36. 
 12 Id. at 35–36. 
 13 Id. at 36. 
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the Helling test would also eliminate duplicative litigation and lower 
evidentiary burdens for pro se litigants bringing claims of this type. 
 
II.  HELLING V. MCKINNEY:  A GATEWAY TO THE RECOGNITION OF LEGAL 
HARM FROM COMPELLED ETS EXPOSURE 
When the Supreme Court decided Helling in 1993, the general 
public was not well informed about the connection between ETS ex-
posure and future harm.  The Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) had that very year released a landmark report classifying ETS 
as a class A carcinogen, or a substance known to cause cancer in hu-
mans.14  Tobacco companies reacted quickly to discredit the damag-
ing report.15  In addition to political maneuvers to discredit the EPA 
report, the tobacco companies also filed a lawsuit against the gov-
ernment with the intent of having the report formally vacated.16  The 
initial lawsuit succeeded in doing this, as a North Carolina District 
Court judge ruled that the EPA had exceeded its authority and vi-
olated procedural mandates in developing the 1993 report.17  The de-
cision in that case would stand for nine years, until vacated by the 
Fourth Circuit in 2002.18  In the meantime, however, the case stood as 
a powerful tool for the tobacco companies to foster doubt about the 
1993 report.  Accordingly, public understanding of the causal link be-
tween ETS and future harm developed slowly,19 though legislatures 
were increasingly moving to outlaw smoking in public places.20 
 
 14 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING, at 1–1 
(1993), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/ets/etsindex.cfm (“ETS is a human 
lung carcinogen, responsible for approximately 3,000 lung cancer deaths annually in U.S. 
nonsmokers.”). 
 15 See Monique E. Muggli et al., The Tobacco Industry’s Political Efforts to Derail the EPA Report on 
ETS, 26 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 167, 167–77 (2004) (detailing the tobacco industry’s 
reaction to the 1993 EPA report). 
 16 Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435, 466 (M.D.N.C. 
1998), vacated 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 17 Id. at 466. 
 18 Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 313 F.3d at 862. 
 19 With the EPA’s 1993 report under legal scrutiny, activity in medical journals was impor-
tant for increasing public awareness of ETS harmfulness.  See, e.g., Victor M. Cardenas et 
al., Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer Mortality in the American Cancer Society’s 
Cancer Prevention Study II, 8 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 57, 57–63 (1997) (finding results 
that “agree with the EPA summary estimate that spousal smoking increases lung cancer 
risk by about 20 percent in never smoking women”); Hari H. Dayal et al., Passive Smoking 
in Obstructive Respiratory Diseases in an Industrialized Urban Population, 65 ENVTL. RES. 161, 
161–71 (1994) (finding passive smoking as a “significant risk factor” for obstructive respi-
ratory disease); George Howard et al., Active and Passive Smoking Are Associated with In-
creased Carotid Wall Thickness:  The Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities Study, 154 ARCH 
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The key to finding a prisoner’s ETS exposure level unconstitu-
tional would be to concretize the connection between the ETS expo-
sure and future harm.  Cases preceding Helling had established that, 
for Eighth Amendment purposes, inmates’ basic human needs must 
be satisfied, including a condition of “reasonable safety.”21  Many cas-
es had approved a remedy for unsafe conditions prior to the materia-
lization of a harmful event.22  Consequently, the Eighth Amendment 
had expanded to cover situations in which current practices clearly 
placed the prisoner in danger of future harm.  Important cases of this 
type included remedies for a failure to provide proper medical care 
to prisoners, on the theory that withholding such care would result in 
a lingering discomfort somewhat akin to actual torture.23  At this time, 
however, the idea of future harm manifesting as a direct result of ETS 
 
INTERNAL MED. 1277, 1277–82 (1994) (finding a significant increase in carotid artery in-
ter-medial thickness in men exposed to increasing hours of ETS exposure per week); Da-
vid J. Howard et al, Environmental Tobacco Smoke in the Workplace Induces Oxidative Stress in 
Employees, Including Increased Production of 8-Hydroxy-2’-Deoxyguanosine, 7 CANCER 
EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 141, 141–46 (1998) (finding evidence suggest-
ing that exposure to ETS in the workplace causes “oxidative stress, resulting in DNA 
damage and potentially increasing the risk of certain diseases”); J. Trédaniel et al., Expo-
sure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Risk of Lung Cancer:  The Epidemiological Evidence, 7 
EUR. RESPIRATORY. J. 1877, 1877–88 (1994) (surveying available studies and stating that 
“the causal association between ETS exposure and lung cancer now seems well-
established; however, its public health impact is still debated”); A. Judson Wells, Passive 
Smoking as a Cause of Heart Disease, 24 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 546, 546–54 (1994) (conclud-
ing that “passive smoking increases the coronary death rate among U.S. never smokers by 
20%, to 70%”).  But see Gio Batta Gori, Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Coronary Heart 
Syndromes:  Absence of an Association, 21 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 281, 281–95 
(1995) (asserting that “[b]y scientific standards, the weight of evidence continues to falsi-
fy the hypothesis that ETS exposure might be a CHD [coronary heart disease] factor”); S. 
Hockertz et al., Acute Effects of Smoking and High Experimental Exposure to Environmental To-
bacco Smoke (ETS) on the Immune System, 10 CELL BIOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 177, 177–90 
(1994) (“[O]ur data do not favor immunosuppression and the possibility of increased 
risk of infection in nonsmokers exposed to ETS under real-life conditions.”); Geoffrey C. 
Kabat et al., Relation Between Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer in 
Lifetime Nonsmokers, 142 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 141, 141–48 (1995) (finding “little indica-
tion of an association of environmental tobacco smoke with lung cancer in nonsmok-
ers”). 
 20 See Kabat, supra note 1, at 194–99 (tabulating existing ETS legislation including effective 
date of operation). 
 21 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); see also 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (finding it “cruel and unusual pu-
nishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions”). 
 22 See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a prisoner 
need not actually be assaulted before gaining relief); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1303 
(5th Cir. 1974) (entitling inmates to relief under Eighth Amendment when their person-
al safety was threatened by the removal of electrical wiring and the commingling of dis-
eased prisoners). 
 23 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
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exposure was relatively attenuated and insufficient to show legal cau-
sation. 
A brief overview of the facts of Helling are helpful to understand 
how the Supreme Court approached the case and came to apply an 
Eighth Amendment analysis to ETS exposure cases.  In 1987, when 
the case first arose, William McKinney was incarcerated in the Nevada 
State Prison.24  McKinney filed a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, alleging that he had been assigned to a cell with an inmate 
who smoked five packs of cigarettes per day.25  McKinney alleged that 
because of his compelled exposure to the accompanying cigarette 
smoke, he suffered from nosebleeds, headaches, chest pains, and a 
lack of energy.26  McKinney sought monetary damages, an injunction 
prohibiting defendants from housing him with smoking inmates, and 
attorney fees.27  The magistrate to whom the District Court delegated 
the issue analyzed McKinney’s claims in two regards:  First, whether 
an inmate has a constitutional right to a smoke-free environment, 
and second, whether the guards at his facility had been deliberately 
indifferent to McKinney’s medical needs.28  The District Court ulti-
mately rendered a directed verdict against McKinney.29  On appeal 
the Ninth Circuit held that “even if an inmate cannot show that he 
suffers from serious, immediate medical symptoms caused by expo-
sure to ETS,” compelled exposure could be cruel and unusual pu-
nishment if it posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the inmate’s 
health.30  The Supreme Court first granted certiorari to the case from 
the Ninth Circuit to mandate that the Court undertake the subjective 
analysis of whether prison authorities demonstrated “deliberate indif-
ference” to the plaintiff’s situation.31  The Court again took the case 
on appeal after the initial remand to clarify the entirety of the test to 
be applied to prisoner ETS claims.32  This latter Supreme Court deci-
sion came down in 1993; this Comment analyzes the present applica-
tion of the test the Court then directed to be utilized in Eighth 
Amendment ETS exposure cases. 
As stated, by 1993, some courts had entertained arguments of se-
rious harm resulting from ETS exposure, but others were hesitant to 
 
 24 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 28 (1993). 
 25 Id. 
 26 McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1502 (9th Cir 1991). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 1503. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at 1503–04. 
 31 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1993). 
 32 Id. at 30–31. 
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find an immediate causal connection between ETS exposure and se-
rious physical harm.33  Indeed, this was McKinney’s main hurdle at 
the outset of his lawsuit.34  Against this backdrop, the argument of the 
United States as amicus in Helling that “the harm to any particular in-
dividual from exposure to ETS is speculative, that the risk is not suffi-
ciently grave to implicate a ‘serious medical nee[d],’ and that expo-
sure to ETS is not contrary to current standards of decency,” is not 
markedly inappropriate.35  The Helling Court, however, disagreed, 
and found that compulsory ETS exposure in prison could violate the 
Eighth Amendment as an unreasonable danger to health, provided 
that the plaintiff could satisfy all components of the test put forth by 
the Court.36 
The Helling test uses objective and subjective components to de-
termine whether the ETS exposure rises to a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.37  The subjective component of the test for Eighth 
Amendment suitability of prison conditions requires that the prison-
er demonstrate “deliberate indifference” on behalf of the prison au-
thorities.38  This standard is divorced from any consideration of the 
extent of the harm of ETS, as it seeks to ensure that prison officials 
are not punished for the existence of improper conditions of which 
they had no knowledge.39 
The objective component of the Helling test attempts to judge 
whether the ETS exposure is sufficiently grave as to warrant the key 
finding of causation between current practices and likely future 
harm.40  This question of causation, in the case of latent harm and 
scientific uncertainty, is necessarily quite grey.  The test requires that 
the prisoner show that his or her “future health [has been] unrea-
sonably endangered, . . . . that he himself is being exposed to unrea-
 
 33 See, e.g., Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1992) (characterizing 
ETS exposure as producing a “potential, distant harm” to health and stressing that pris-
oner displayed no symptoms “different from those suffered by everyone in society”). 
 34 See McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991) (detailing procedural his-
tory of the case). 
 35 Helling, 509 U.S. at 34 (citing Brief, supra note 8, at 20–22). 
 36 Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–36. 
 37 Id. at 35. 
 38 Id. at 36.  See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991) (holding that a prisoner 
must show a culpable state of mind on the part of the prison officials to prove an Eighth 
Amendment violation based on the conditions of confinement). 
 39 See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (establishing the necessity of a subjective inquiry in an Eighth 
Amendment analysis by stating that “[t]he infliction of punishment is a deliberate act in-
tended to chastise or deter”) (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 
1985)). 
 40 Helling, 509 U.S. at 35. 
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sonably high levels of ETS.”41  This takes the form of a “scientific and 
statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm” and the 
likelihood of actual harm resulting from the ETS exposure.42  The 
Court noted that the prisoner’s current holding condition is “[p]lainly 
relevant” to this inquiry.43  Regulatory mechanisms and policies in 
place at the holding facility for minimizing health risks from ETS are 
also relevant.44  All of these factors are intuitive to the inquiry of 
whether the prisoner’s exposure to ETS is overwhelming enough to 
present a direct danger to his or her future health, and so constitute 
an Eighth Amendment violation. 
The Helling Court, however, added one more consideration to the 
objective prong by requiring a court “to assess whether society con-
siders the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it vi-
olates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwilling-
ly to such a risk.”45  “In other words,” the Court stated, “the prisoner 
must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s 
society chooses to tolerate.”46  This “social tolerance” prong is long-
standing in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.47  It serves the impor-
tant function of ensuring that the construction of the Eighth 
Amendment remains in tune with the current practices and know-
ledge of an ever-changing society.48  In Helling, mandating the fulfill-
ment of the social tolerance prong allowed the Court to send a signal 
that ETS had been proven dangerous to health, while remaining con-
servative by ultimately reserving the exact judgment of the extent of 
this danger to “society,” or more likely, the representative branches of 
government.49  The social tolerance sub-inquiry theoretically would 
ensure that the constitutional standards for ETS exposure in prisons 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 36. 
 43 Id. at 35–36. 
 44 Id. at 36. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (“The [Eighth Amendment] in the 
opinion of the learned commentators may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened 
to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a 
humane justice.”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (“[W]e have held 
repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with ‘the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” (quoting 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))). 
 48 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 49 See Kraft, supra note 6, at 279 (“If the Helling Court was to adhere to its limited role in the 
U.S. judiciary, it had only one choice:  to send a signal to the legislatures and organiza-
tions that have the resources, the public support, and the power to address the problem 
of ETS.”). 
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would remain appropriate in the face of both changes in social atti-
tudes regarding ETS and the future accumulation of knowledge con-
cerning the causal relationship between ETS and future harm. 
III.  IN A DECADE OF ACCELERATING CHANGE, THE HELLING TEST 
BEGINS TO SHOW ITS WEAKNESSES 
Eighteen years have passed since the formulation of the Helling 
test for determining unreasonable exposure to ETS in prisons.  Since 
the EPA’s classification of ETS as a class A carcinogen in 1993,50 more 
state and local governments gradually began to pass general smoking 
bans affecting restaurants, bars, and most enclosed workplaces.51  
Most general statewide bans contain varying numbers of exceptions, 
which leads to differential restrictions upon smoking in public spac-
es.52  However, more than thirty-five states currently have some state-
wide form of smoking control in place,53 with Michigan54 and Wiscon-
sin55 having recently joined the more restrictive ranks.  The shift is 
clear:  The public attitude toward smoking in enclosed and public 
spaces has shifted from generally permissive to presumptively barred, 
albeit to different extents according to state law.56 
In this light, it seems that the flexibility afforded by the Helling 
test’s social tolerance prong would work to lessen the extent of ETS 
which a prisoner’s holding environment might contain under the 
Constitution.  In practice, however, the standard seems to have be-
come muddled over time.  And most unfortunately, the outcomes of 
 
 50 Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Designates Passive Smoking a “Class A” or Known 
Human Carcinogen (Jan. 7, 1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/
smoke/01.htm. 
 51 Kabat, supra note 1, at 134. 
 52 Id. at 135; see also Public Place Smoking Bans in States, 2008, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=86&cat=2 (last visited May 11, 
2011) (detailing the varying exceptions to the smoking bans in different states). 
 53 See Public Place Smoking Bans in States, 2008, supra note 52 (finding 35 states with active 
public place smoking bans in 2008, including Washington D.C.); cf. Kabat, supra note 1, 
at 191–92, 194–99 (listing different levels of smoking bans present in 2008, and consider-
ing 25 measures as sufficiently restrictive to constitute “modern statewide bans”). 
 54 See Peter Luke, Michigan Workplaces—Including Bars and Restaurants—Will Go Smokefree in 
May, MLIVE.COM (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2009/12/
granholm_gets_smoking_ban_will.html (detailing the recent public smoking ban in 
Michigan). 
 55 See Stacy Forster Smoking Ban Would Take Effect in July 2010, JS ONLINE (May 6, 2009), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/44464502.html (outlining the recent smok-
ing ban in the state of Wisconsin). 
 56 See Kabat, supra note 1, at 130 (“Whereas smoking was previously permitted in pub-
lic . . . we increasingly live in a country where insular smoking spaces are carved out of a 
public domain in which smoking is generally forbidden.”) 
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many of the cases which turn on the objective prong of Helling appear 
to depend on the confused social tolerance sub-inquiry. 
Simmons v. Sager exemplifies a relatively early approach by a court 
and is instructive as to why the social tolerance prong has become 
problematic in this sphere.57  In this case, the plaintiff prisoner re-
peatedly asked to be moved to non-smoking quarters, as he had suf-
fered bronchial pneumonia as a child and was susceptible to respira-
tory infections.58  The court dismissed the case in a short opinion 
noting that the prison had extensive policies in place to mitigate the 
effects of ETS, and the plaintiff was not suffering from any symptoms 
of ETS overexposure.59  The court fully explained its conclusion that 
the ETS exposure was not unreasonable by noting that the plaintiff 
had not alleged that his childhood respiratory problems had per-
sisted into adulthood, and that the plaintiff had not made any ETS-
related medical complaints while at the prison.60 
The opinion continued, however, to put forth a familiar argu-
ment: 
[i]n many places in society, non-smokers must deal unwillingly with ETS 
on a daily basis—smoke on others’ clothes or on the motel room 
drapes . . . or the defiant smoker in the non-smoking section of the res-
taurant or bus.  These ETS occurrences in the free world are widely tole-
rated.  As society has not yet demanded that all public areas be kept free 
of ETS, the court cannot find that society would require prisons to do 
so.61 
The resurrection of the argument put forth in the 1993 United States 
amicus brief to Helling62 is superfluous to the determination in this 
case that the plaintiff, objectively, did not suffer scientifically unrea-
sonable exposure to ETS.  Courts’ continued use of this social toler-
ance standard in the midst of a decade of quickly changing ETS laws 
has served only to complicate the task of determining a “reasonable” 
amount of ETS exposure, beyond that which might be scientifically 
determined. 
One complication presented by continued reliance on the social 
tolerance inquiry is the difficulty courts will have in citing precedent 
as authority on the matter.  As public opinion on ETS shifts, a level of 
ETS exposure which a court may have found tolerable in the time of 
Helling may no longer be considered so.  While this appears to be the 
 
 57 Simmons v. Sager, 964 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Va. 1997). 
 58 Id. at 211–12. 
 59 Id. at 212–13. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 213. 
 62 Brief, supra note 8, at 20.  
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Helling rule functioning properly, the inability of a court to strongly 
rest on precedent weakens the court’s rulings concerning social to-
lerance or unreasonable ETS exposure.  This disadvantage is particu-
larly relevant in times of rapid change, such as the decade after the 
Helling decision.  The court in Gill v. Smith noted this difficulty while 
laying out precedent relevant to the case at hand:  “[W]hile this deci-
sion [considered as precedent] remains good law,” the court cau-
tioned, “it may not provide the current and accurate parameters for 
judging what levels of exposure to ETS are sufficient to support an 
Eighth Amendment claim.”63  The precedent in question, Oliver v. 
Deen, had been decided seven years earlier, in 1996.64  The majority of 
the precedent the Gill court considered on the issue was hardly more 
recent.65  While the difficulty recognized by the Gill court may not be 
present in every case,66 it highlights one disadvantage, caused by the 
nature of the legal system, of pegging a determination of an individ-
ual’s unreasonable exposure to ETS to a conception of the public’s 
shifting tolerance for exposure to the carcinogen. 
The social tolerance prong of the ETS exposure test also presents 
the difficulty of applying a general social standard to judge the im-
pact of a substance on a given individual.  In 1998, the court in Scott 
v. District of Columbia struggled with this very problem.67  Notably, Scott 
serves as an important limitation to Helling by standing for the propo-
sition that prisoners are not entitled to a smoke-free environment.68  
In the course of the opinion, however, the court wrestled with the 
concept of objectively determining the reasonableness of ETS expo-
sure.  Particularly relevant is the court’s examination of a plaintiff’s 
expert testimony dealing with causative difficulties.  The court wrote: 
[Plaintiff] failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between his condi-
tions and an increased risk of harm to him from second-hand smoke.  Dr. 
Munzer’s testimony established no such nexus . . . . Dr. Munzer testified 
that the health effects of exposure to second-hand smoke var[y] tre-
mendously with the individual, and in order to assess the actual 
 
 63 Gill v. Smith, 283 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 64 Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 65 See Gill v. Smith, 283 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767–68 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing three cases from 
1996, one from 1997, and one from 2000, as well as one case from 2003 concerning only 
the proper production of evidence). 
 66 See, e.g., Adams v. Banks, 663 F. Supp. 2d 485, 490 (S.D. Miss. 2009) (citing two Fifth Cir-
cuit cases decided in the previous year which provided clear guidance on the evidentiary 
standard for summary judgment in ETS cases of this type). 
 67 Scott v. District of Columbia, 139 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., Dawson 
v. District of Columbia, 525 U.S. 851 (1998). 
 68 Id. at 943. 
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risk . . . [he] would have to be familiar with the plaintiffs’ medical histo-
ries.69 
Here the court primarily noted the lack of objective, scientific evi-
dence which might have indicated that the plaintiff had been sub-
jected to unreasonable amounts of ETS.  The plaintiff’s failure on the 
scientific harm sub-inquiry of Helling’s objective prong was dispositive.  
However, the conceptual difficulties of the social tolerance sub-
inquiry also began to emerge in this 1998 case.  The nature of this in-
quiry is to take the level of societal ETS tolerance as instructive to an 
individual’s complaint of cruel and unusual punishment.  The expert 
witness for the plaintiffs, absent individual-specific information, clear-
ly hesitated to opine as to the extent of possible effects of ETS upon a 
prisoner.70  Dr. Munzer’s professional statement prompts one to ques-
tion why, if an individual’s reaction to ETS “var[ies] tremendously” 
according to multiple factors,71 it is proper to hinge an Eighth 
Amendment determination of proper jail conditions upon the hypo-
thetical ETS tolerance of a potentially fractured and uninformed so-
ciety—a tolerance level which still may be quite harmful for an in-
mate particularly susceptible to ETS. 
This question of propriety is somewhat illuminated by an under-
standing of the history behind why courts came to apply this social to-
lerance analysis to Eighth Amendment ETS cases.  As mentioned 
above, the cruel and unusual clause of the Eighth Amendment histor-
ically applied to a quite different form of treatment.  The provision, 
present in a similar form in the English Bill of Rights of 1689,72 was 
 
 69 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id.; see, e.g., Giorgos S. Metsios et al., A Brief Exposure to Moderate Passive Smoke Increases Me-
tabolism and Thyroid Hormone Secretion, 92 J. CLINICAL. ENDOCRINOLOGY. & METABOLISM 
208, 209–11(2007) (finding that ETS exposure at bar/restaurant levels resulted in 
decrements in gonadal hormones for both sexes and marked increases in thyroid hor-
mone secretion and systolic blood pressure in men); Brian W. P. Seymour et al, Second-
Hand Smoke Increases Bronchial Hyperreactivity and Eosinophilia in a Murine Model of Allergic 
Aspergillosis, 10 CLINICAL & DEV. IMMUNOLOGY 35, 41 (2003) (finding that ETS can cause 
exacerbation of asthma, demonstrated by functional airway hyper-responsiveness and ele-
vated levels of blood eosinophilia); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE 
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO TOBACCO SMOKE:  A REPORT OF 
THE SURGEON GENERAL 669 (2006), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
secondhandsmoke/report/fullreport.pdf (“As understanding increases regarding health 
consequences from even brief exposures to secondhand smoke, it becomes even clearer 
that the health of nonsmokers overall, and particularly the health of children, individuals 
with existing heart and lung problems, and other vulnerable populations, requires a 
higher priority and greater protection.”). 
 72 THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS:  ORIGINAL ARGUMENTS AND FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENTS 
57–60 (Gordon Lloyd & Margie Lloyd eds., 1998); see English Bill of Rights of 1689, re-
printed in Carl Stephenson & Frank Marcham, Sources of Constitutional History (1937). 
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included primarily to prevent torture and barbarous forms of capital 
punishment.73  The Eighth Amendment was therefore largely con-
cerned with present forms of extreme physical and mental harm.74  At 
the time, however, the Eighth Amendment was rarely used to prevent 
this type of harm.75  But in 1910, the Supreme Court envisioned the 
Eighth Amendment as having a broader application, and it extended 
Eighth Amendment construction to cover proportionality of punish-
ment to the crime committed.76  This philosophy of a broad and pro-
gressive mode of interpretation has persisted, and Helling represents 
the extension of this principle to a type of harm—latent and causally 
unclear, caused by an agent common in society—previously not con-
templated by Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.77  Indeed, the rec-
ognition of ETS exposure as a potential “cruel and unusual punish-
ment” was vigorously opposed not only by the Helling dissenters78 but 
also by commentators.79 
When the Supreme Court expanded Eighth Amendment juri-
sprudence to this new form of punishment, it necessarily brought 
along the modes of analysis which it had developed to judge the cir-
cumstances previously recognized as forms of punishment.80  The 
Court did not alter the existing jurisprudence to accommodate its 
novel and progressive decision.  Therefore, a court must go beyond 
“a scientific and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential 
 
 73 See also Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence:  Condi-
tions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 376 (1995) (tracing in part the development of 
the judicial construction of cruel and unusual punishment).  See generally Celia Rumann, 
Tortured History:  Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. 
L. REV. 661, 673 (2004) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment squarely applies to interro-
gation torture). 
 74 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 75 Gutterman, supra note 73, at 376. 
 76 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“Time works changes, brings into 
existence new conditions and purposes.  Therefore a principle, to be vital must be capa-
ble of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”). 
 77 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). 
 78 Id. at 37–38 (Thomas, J, dissenting) (“Today the Court expands the Eighth Amendment 
in yet another direction, holding that it applies to a prisoner’s mere risk of in-
jury . . . . This decision . . . rests on the premise that deprivations suffered by a prisoner 
constitute ‘punishmen[t]’ for Eighth Amendment purposes, even when the deprivations 
have not been inflicted as part of a criminal sentence . . . . I have serious doubts about 
this premise.”). 
 79 See, e.g., Kane, supra note 4, at 1400 (arguing that Helling’s construction of the Eighth 
Amendment gives prisoners rights beyond those held by citizens in society); Sara L. Rose, 
Comment, “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Need Not Be Cruel, Unusual, or Punishment, 24 
CAP. U. L. REV. 827, 828 (1995) (taking issue with the broad construction of the Eighth 
Amendment and the analyses developed). 
 80 See generally Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–36. 
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harm and the likelihood that such injury to health [of the individual] 
will actually be caused by exposure to ETS,” and question society’s to-
lerance of this health risk.81  Since the Court shoehorned ETS cases 
into an existing mode of analysis, the question of whether the stan-
dard social tolerance inquiry might become problematic, outmoded, 
or conceptually improper was either marginalized, overlooked, or left 
to be resolved in the future. 
IV.  BEYOND LEGAL DIFFICULTIES:  ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH 
RETAINING AN INDEPENDENT SOCIAL TOLERANCE INQUIRY 
The discovery of procedural and ethical difficulties with the appli-
cation of a social tolerance analysis of Eighth Amendment ETS cases 
warrants a closer look at the problem.  This Comment is concerned 
with the practical and ethical inconsistencies inherent in determining 
an imprisoned individual’s right to be free from unreasonable expo-
sure to a class A carcinogen based on a mass and diffuse third party’s 
opinion of how tolerable exposure to that carcinogen might be.  Af-
ter further exploring the nature of the problem, this Comment will 
propose positive and practical steps judiciaries can take to improve 
the uncomfortable marriage of ETS case facts and traditional Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, for both judiciaries and plaintiffs. 
First, there is a practical difficulty in the idea of determining the 
appropriate extent of safeguards for an individual’s health based on 
the opinion of a large and divided society.  It is important that a court 
does not appear to make a determination of public tolerance of ETS 
in a manner susceptible to criticisms of being merely ad hoc.  Look-
ing to state legislation may be some indication of how firm the public 
stance is on a certain issue.  But ETS legislation may not necessarily 
be a sound reflection of exactly what society thinks of that issue.  
Such legislation is a particularly unsuitable basis upon which to judge 
a matter of gradation, like ETS exposure.  While the social tolerance 
inquiry is squarely suitable for questions of whether a certain practice 
or procedure is acceptable—dragging a condemned prisoner to the 
hanging site,82 for example—it seems unclear exactly how a judge can 
 
 81 Id. at 36. 
 82 See Jonathan H. Vold, Note, The Eighth Amendment “Punishment” Clause after Helling v. 
McKinney:  Four Terms, Two Standards, and a Search for Definition, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 215, 
220 (1994) (outlining early practices barred under the Eighth Amendment, including 
dragging condemned prisoners to the hanging site, “burning at the stake, crucifixion, 
and breaking on the wheel”). 
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determine whether a given society deems a certain amount of smoke 
exposure to be tolerable. 
For all of the discussion above regarding changing social attitudes 
about ETS, there is hardly a firm consensus amongst state legislatures 
on the proper limits of ETS restrictions.83  This is problematic, again, 
because the inquiry is one of scale, not of existence.  Courts are also 
faced with the difficulty of determining the proper weight to give leg-
islation or executive orders and reports.84  Further conceptual diffi-
culties arise because many of the regulations that do exist are ulti-
mately products of intense lobbying efforts from both sides of the 
issue.85  The bans therefore often contain exclusions and inclusions of 
all types.86  This result would seem to indicate the effectiveness of in-
dustry lobbyists more than any consensus of the people of a given 
state whether, for example, it is acceptable to allow smoking in tobac-
co lounges but not in bars.87 
Even were legislation assumed to be accurately reflective of socie-
ty’s tolerance for a certain level of ETS exposure, a final layer of prac-
tical difficulty in determining the tolerance of society for ETS is that 
the subject at issue, tobacco, is imbued in our historical and cultural 
consciousness.88  This is a basic difference from the traditional sub-
jects of the inquiry—modes of torture, capital punishment, and dis-
proportionate legal penalties.89  As a result, even in the case of strong 
anti-ETS legislation there are likely significant minority interests not 
reflected in the final legislation. 
Two disconcerting ethical problems accompany the above practic-
al difficulties of the social tolerance Helling sub-inquiry.  At its most 
basic level, the inquiry works to turn the individual prisoner into the 
construct of an average person in society, who withstands exposure to 
 
 83 See Kabat, supra note 1, at 137 (classifying states into five groups, each with their own in-
ternal differentiation, according to rigidity of ETS restrictions). 
 84 See, e.g., Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 265 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The dissent characte-
rizes this reference [to an Executive Order banning smoking in state buildings] as an at-
tempt to form a societal consensus from a single state regulation.  However, we refer to 
the regulation merely to show that Atkinson has offered some proof of a societal consen-
sus.  Proof of a national consensus might include, inter alia, the federal regulation which 
protects the public and federal employees from ETS in all federal workplaces . . . .”). 
 85 Kabat, supra note 1, at 131, 165–70. 
 86 See Public Place Smoking Bans in States, 2008, supra note 52. 
 87 See generally Kabat, supra note 1, at 179–84 (discussing the lack of advocates for tobacco 
lounges that can “asses their proper place within ETS regimes). 
 88 See generally ALTERING AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS:  THE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG 
USE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800–2000 (Sarah W. Tracy & Caroline Jean Acker eds. 2004) 
(discussing the histories of different drugs in America, including tobacco and alcohol). 
 89 See Vold, supra note 82, at 219–20 (tracing the background and development of the con-
struction of “punishment” contained in the Eighth Amendment). 
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ETS accordingly.  The problem, as noted above, is that susceptibility 
to ETS exposure “var[ies] tremendously with the individual.”90  While 
it is true that prisoners give up some rights and privileges because of 
their crimes against society, individual status should not be one of 
them when the characteristic being glossed over is susceptibility to a 
class A carcinogen. 
The potential ramifications of the Helling test, when viewed in this 
light, are somewhat unsettling.  The Helling Court put forth the scien-
tific reasonableness and social tolerance components of the objective 
prong as conjunctive factors, necessitating a finding of both for the 
claim to succeed on this basis.91  Accordingly, a prisoner with very 
high sensitivity to ETS could suffer scientifically unreasonable expo-
sure to ETS yet lose his claim on Helling's objective prong if a court 
determined that the statistical measure of ETS exposure in that case 
would be tolerated by society.  The inequity of this possibility—or at 
least puzzlement as to why this could be the case—demonstrates the 
value of a new approach to the social tolerance prong of prison ETS 
exposure cases. 
With the current analysis, not only is the consideration of a pris-
oner’s health-related treatment being outsourced to society, but so is 
the extent of his or her constitutional right to safe conditions of con-
finement.92  Again, the source of the difficulty lies in the nature of the 
subject being judged; if this were a question of an acutely harmful 
event, one’s rights would likely be clearer, and the danger of an over-
riding “social opinion” less.93  For example, one’s right to not be as-
saulted is well-recorded throughout the country, a point which is not 
seriously disputed.94  Accordingly, courts have held that prisoners as-
saulted by guards, or even placed in a position in which they are likely 
to be assaulted by others, are entitled to Eighth Amendment relief.95  
 
 90 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 91 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35–36 (1993) (“With respect to the objective factor, 
McKinney must show that he himself is being exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS 
. . . . Also with respect to the objective factor, determining whether McKinney’s condi-
tions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment requires more than a scientific and 
statistical inquiry . . . .”). 
 92 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (discuss-
ing the duty imposed by the Constitution upon the state to assume responsibility to pro-
tect the safety of a prisoner); Youngberg v Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (consi-
dering the unconstitutionality of placing convicted criminals and the involuntarily 
committed in unsafe conditions). 
 93 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 94 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1985) (defining different types of assault). 
 95 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1992) (declaring excessive force against prison-
er as definitively falling under Eighth Amendment auspices); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 
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Since the activity considered is relatively uncommon and never tole-
rated, the individual’s right seems to be in all cases coextensive with 
those in society.  A similar, neat result occurs when analyzing a tradi-
tional Eighth Amendment subject, like torture.96  But when the ex-
ternalities of smoking are considered, the same analysis becomes 
blurred because it is a common activity long tolerated,97 and only re-
cently restricted in common areas to varying degrees.98  In this case, 
pegging the prisoner’s right to an idea of the public tolerance for 
ETS is bound to be subject to dissonant results.  Does a prisoner in 
Utah have greater constitutional protection than a prisoner in North 
Carolina?99  Did the extent of a Michigan prisoner’s constitutional 
rights alter in May 2010?100  While affirmative answers to these ques-
tions would seem absurd, determinations of the public’s tolerance of 
ETS exposure by some other, more nebulous calculation may be se-
riously challenged as forming an ad hoc legal standard.  In light of 
current scientific knowledge about ETS and its direct effects, the ex-
tent of a prisoner’s rights should simply not be determined based on 
the outcome of a clouded analysis concerning social tolerance. 
V.  AMENDING JURISPRUDENCE:  SUGGESTED PRACTICAL ALTERATIONS 
TO EIGHTH AMENDMENT ETS CASE ANALYSIS 
It is not feasible to simply do away with the public tolerance in-
quiry.  As stated, this is an important and traditional component of 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  The inquiry has sometimes of-
fered a positive and valuable way to look at ETS cases around the 
time of the Helling decision.  It has allowed, and may still allow, shifts 
in public sentiment to effectively substitute for absolute causative cer-
tainty.  This extra flexibility in the objective Helling prong allowed 
courts to lower the evidentiary standard for causation and afford 
greater protection to prisoners who, by similar facts, may not have 
 
559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a prisoner need not actually be assaulted before 
gaining relief).  Note that both of these cases were decided before Helling. 
 96 See generally Rumann, supra note 73 (analyzing the Eighth Amendment as it relates to tor-
ture). 
 97 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 98 See Public Place Smoking Bans in States, 2008, supra note 52 (detailing variations of public 
smoking bans in place in 2008). 
 99 Utah has one of the strictest public smoking bans in the nation, while North Carolina is 
the most permissive state when it comes to public smoking.  See Kabat, supra note 1, at 
138, 144–45. 
100 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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been given constitutional protection only a few years earlier.101  Abso-
lute scientific certainty of causation between ETS and a given illness, 
or likelihood of a future illness, may ultimately be unattainable.  Pre-
sently, however, a solely scientific and statistical inquiry should legally 
suffice to establish both probable ETS causation of harm and the ap-
propriate Eighth Amendment threshold of harm.  The heightened 
scientific consensus of the positive harmful effects of ETS and the re-
cent social shift from permissive of public smoking to presumptively 
intolerant of ETS102 together signal the arrival of a critical point at 
which the “public tolerance” inquiry of Helling may be functionally 
dispatched.  Doing so both simplifies the inquiry and brings it into 
proper consonance with an ethical analysis. 
This Comment proposes a simple and not wholly unprecedented 
method to achieve the above, the adoption of which would not tam-
per with a court’s essential reasoning or final decision.  By merging 
the two objective Helling inquiries, courts can signal a tougher stance 
on compelled ETS exposure in prisons, recognize that ETS exposure 
is highly consequential, and avoid determining the extent of a pris-
oner's right to a healthy environment by referencing a narrow ap-
proximation of society's tolerance for ETS exposure.  As a result of 
such a merger, a finding of social intolerance would as a matter of 
course follow a determination of scientifically unreasonable ETS ex-
posure. 
Merging the inquiries of whether the prisoner has been subjected 
to an unreasonable amount of ETS and whether society would be to-
lerant of the amount of exposure would be a judicial signal that com-
pelled exposure to unreasonably high level of ETS is per se intolera-
ble and deserving of a remedy.103  By this construction, a court would 
no longer have to go beyond the “scientific and statistical inquiry into 
the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that such in-
jury to health will actually be caused by exposure to ETS,” as Helling 
 
101 Compare Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156, 161 (7th Cir. 1996) (granting summary judgment for 
defendants where the plaintiff, a mild asthmatic, was housed with a smoker for 133 days) 
with McPherson v. Coombe, 29 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting defen-
dant’s summary judgment as to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim while denying summary 
judgment as to plaintiff’s Eight Amendment claims, where the plaintiff was housed with 
41 smokers in a poorly ventilated housing unit, because of factual questions as to whether 
smoke conditions in the prison violated contemporary standards of decency). 
102 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
103 Cf. Kabat, supra note 1, at 175–77 (characterizing courts as unable and imprudent to un-
dertake changes to law, and it is up to the legislatures and other organizations to address 
the problems of ETS). 
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mandated in 1993.104  Granted, the Helling Court’s direction to do so 
has become quite venerated in cases of this type, as it is directly 
quoted in most of the cases relevant to this Comment.  But merging 
the inquiries is not to do away with one or the other.  It would simply 
be judicial recognition that, broadly, the idea of compelled exposure 
to unreasonably high levels of ETS has become intolerable to society 
generally.105  This presumption, which the defendant would carry the 
burden of disproving, is justified by a majority of states having 
adopted public smoking bans.106  Past cases and current attitudes in-
dicate, however, that the presumption would rarely be overcome. 
Courts have previously explored the idea of merging the inquiries 
in different ways.  The most radical of these, since overruled, came in 
Crowder v. District of Columbia.107  In Crowder, the court ruled that any 
exposure to ETS was per se intolerable and unreasonable.108  Beyond 
simply being an illustration of a court’s willingness to consider func-
tionally dispatching the social tolerance inquiry—though by a much 
more extreme means in this case—Crowder instantiates the previously 
mentioned difficulties of looking to legislation for a determination of 
social ETS tolerance.  In expressing a prisoner’s right to a smoke-free 
environment, the court explicitly looked to legislation in the District 
of Columbia for authority.109  In that jurisdiction, the legislature had 
extensively recognized the harms of ETS.110  The contention that 
mere exposure to ETS was significantly harmful, however, was still a 
litigable issue; in fact, the District of Columbia “request[ed] the 
Court to go along with . . . [the District’s] repudiation [in its brief] of 
 
104 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). 
105 See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
supra note 71, at 667 (“Since 1986, the attitude of the public toward and the social norms 
around secondhand smoke exposure have changed dramatically to reflect a growing 
viewpoint that the involuntary exposure of nonsmokers to secondhand smoke is unac-
ceptable.”). 
106 About half of the states also currently ban tobacco use in their prisons in an effort to re-
duce health care costs; several others have partial bans in place.  These prison-specific 
bans further justify a presumption that unreasonable exposure to ETS in prison is per se 
intolerable.  See Andrew M. Seaman, States with Tobacco-Free Prisons, USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 
2010, 12:30 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-24-prison-smoking-
ban_N.htm. 
107 Crowder v. District of Columbia, 959 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997). 
108 Id. at 8 n.6 (finding any exposure to tobacco smoke, whether from the same room or 
from an adjacent area, intolerable, by reference to D.C. legislative findings) rev’d sub nom 
Scott v. D.C., 139 F.3d 940, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the notion that prisoners have 
a constitutional right to a smoke-free environment).  See generally Kane, supra note 4 (ar-
guing that Helling v. McKinney grants prisoners the right to a smoke-free environment). 
109 Crowder, 959 F. Supp at 8–9. 
110 Id. at 8. 
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its prior [legislative] findings concerning the ill-effects of second-
hand smoke.”111  In light of current knowledge, a state is less likely 
now to take such a hypocritical position on its own ETS laws when 
seeking to establish the applicable social tolerance standard.  The de-
veloped state of social knowledge and attitudes concerning ETS ex-
posure should, however, similarly encourage courts to take a fresh 
look at the approach to ETS exposure litigation. 
While the Crowder decision did overreach, the general trend to-
ward presumptive intolerance of ETS can be a sufficient basis for re-
cognizing unreasonable exposure to ETS in prison as per se intolerable.  
Only such a single, broad determination is appropriate to ensure that 
prisoners of all states and districts have equally clear rights to a 
healthy environment.  As this Comment has argued, knowledge and 
public opinion have reached a critical point at which this determina-
tion has become politically and judicially feasible.  No inquiry past 
that of unreasonable exposure to ETS should be formally necessary, 
because litigation over the public tolerance of such a scientific and 
statistical determination is superfluous, duplicative, and unethical. 
The suggestion of this Comment to functionally merge the two 
objective Helling inquiries is not as extreme as the 1997 Crowder deci-
sion.  Rather, it walks the line between similar, accepted jurispru-
dence concerning asbestos exposure and the current practice of con-
ducting both inquiries.  Courts have held that prisoners who have 
asbestos exposure claims can establish, first, that “a reasonable person 
would have understood that exposing an inmate to friable asbestos 
could violate the Eighth Amendment.”112  Second, the plaintiff may 
advance the theory that “the right to be free from deliberate indiffe-
rence to serious medical needs, established in Estelle v. Gamble, best 
encompasses the alleged conduct” of knowingly exposing the prison-
er to friable asbestos.113 
Asbestos and ETS are both class A carcinogens, substances known 
to cause cancer in humans.114  It is therefore not extraordinary to 
treat them similarly in a legal sense; the analysis simply becomes a 
matter of degrees.  Since smoking, as noted, is traditional in some 
 
111 Id. at 9.  The court responded:  “This Court declines to accept the District’s unwise and 
indeed unconscionable position.”  Id. 
112 LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1998). 
113 Id. (citation omitted). 
114 See Known and Probable Human Carcinogens, AMER. CANCER SOC’Y http://www.cancer.org/
docroot/PED/content/PED_1_3x_Known_and_Probable_Carcinogens.asp (last updated 
Feb. 17, 2011) (listing all currently known, and potential, carcinogens). 
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sense and imbued in our national consciousness,115 it is politically and 
socially preferable to restrain the standard to one of reasonableness 
rather than complete extirpation.116  In LaBounty v. Coughlin, the 
Court used the “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” 
reasoning of Estelle117 to avoid any inquiry into public tolerance of as-
bestos exposure.118  Merging the objective Helling inquiries theoreti-
cally removes an evidentiary barrier for a prisoner to withstand sum-
mary judgment on an ETS exposure case,119 somewhat replicating 
Labounty.  This Comment does not argue for courts to analyze ETS 
cases by the Estelle and LaBounty application of “serious medical need” 
upon mere exposure—there is no constitutional right to a smoke-free 
atmosphere.120  The more moderate merged inquiry analysis in this 
case recognizes only the right to be free from exposure to ETS of such 
a level that it would cause a serious medical need. 
Recently, courts have demonstrated a willingness to shift eviden-
tiary burdens in light of increased knowledge of the harms of ETS 
exposure.121  Notably, the holdings in question also remove the social 
 
115 See generally ALTERING AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS:  THE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG 
USE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800–2000, supra note 88 at 2–3, 383–401. 
116 Hence the reversal of Crowder v. District of Columbia, 959 F. Supp. 6 (D. D.C. 1997) by Scott 
v. District of Columbia, 139 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
117 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
118 See LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing to undertake the social 
tolerance inquiry). 
119 If not technically lowering the standard, then procedurally lowering it by not requiring 
plaintiffs, many of whom are pro se, to submit evidence that their ETS exposure was of a 
level that the public would not tolerate in addition to evidence that such exposure was un-
reasonable; pro se litigants seem to often neglect the inclusion of the former type of evi-
dence, perhaps because it is unintuitive to do so—however venerated or traditional the 
inquiry.  See, e.g., Judge Castel, Court Rejects Disabled Prisoners’ Second-Hand Smoke Claims 
Arising Before Prison’s Indoor Smoking Ban, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 2005, at 21–22 (“Plaintiffs have 
failed, in opposition to defendants’ motion, to present any evidence that they were ex-
posed to levels of ETS so harmful that ‘it is contrary to current standards of decency for 
anyone to be so exposed against his will.’  Plaintiffs’ pro se status, while implicating a 
more liberal interpretation of their pleadings, does not excuse them from the burden of 
coming forward with concrete evidence . . . . Defendants are entitled to summary judg-
ment on the objective prong of plaintiff’s pre-2001 ETS claim.” (citations omitted)). 
120 See Scott, 139 F.3d at 142. 
121 See Perkins v. Terrell, No. 08–CV–1906, 2010 WL 5488234, at *3 (W.D. La. Dec. 6, 2010) 
(adopting objective standard hold[ing] that there is “no safe level of or exposure to 
second hand smoke” in denying summary judgment to defendant) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Hicks v. Corrections Corp. of Am., No. 08–CV–0687–A, 2009 WL 
2969768, at *6 (W.D. La. Sept. 11, 2009) (denying summary judgment to defendant based 
on evidence adopted from 2006 Surgeon General’s Report finding “no safe level of or 
exposure to second hand smoke”); Sivori v. Epps, No. 2:07–CV–79–MTP, 2009 WL 
799463, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2009) (applying a heightened standard to find objective 
Helling prong satisfied by prolonged ETS exposure for the purposes of withstanding 
summary judgment); see also Fisher v. Caruso, No. 03–CV–71804–DT, 2006 WL 2711807 at 
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tolerance evidentiary burden for plaintiffs seeking to avoid summary 
judgment.  In these recent cases courts have taken judicial notice of a 
2006 Surgeon General’s Report (the “2006 Report”) which con-
cluded that “scientific evidence indicates that there is no risk-free lev-
el of exposure to secondhand smoke.”122  The report further found 
that “[s]ince 1986, the attitude of the public toward . . . secondhand 
smoke exposure [has] changed dramatically to reflect a growing 
viewpoint that the involuntary exposure of nonsmokers to second-
hand smoke is unacceptable.”123  The Surgeon General’s findings are 
clear on both the scientific harm of ETS and the shift in public opi-
nion concerning involuntary ETS exposure. 
By adopting the 2006 Report, these courts have found the objec-
tive Helling prong to be fully satisfied, for the purposes of withstand-
ing summary judgment when a plaintiff merely shows prolonged ex-
posure to ETS.124  Upon the finding of prolonged exposure, the court 
further presumes that the public would not tolerate such exposure.125  
The defendant has an opportunity to rebut the presumption that the 
exposure at issue occurred and is harmful.126  Given the state of ever-
increasing knowledge of the harms of ETS and the steady trend away 
from ETS tolerance, it appears likely that this type of approach will 
become more prevalent in the years ahead. 
Merging the objective Helling inquiries operates in the same vein 
as the aforementioned approach and preserves its reasoning through 
 
*13 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2006) (denying summary judgment to defendant by adopting 
finding of 2006 report that “[s]eparating smokers and nonsmokers in the same airspace is 
not effective, nor is air cleaning or a greater exchange of indoor with outdoor air”). 
122 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 71, at 11; see also supra note 120 and 
accompanying text. 
123 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 71, at 667. 
124 See Perkins, 2010 WL 5488234, at *3 (adopting objective standard hold[ing] that there is 
“no safe level of or exposure to second hand smoke” in denying summary judgment to 
defendant) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hicks, 2009 WL 2969768, at *6–7 (“Ac-
cordingly, this court accepts the scientific evidence in the Surgeon General’s 2006 Report 
as meeting the objective component of Helling, as well as Helling’s requirement of a show-
ing that society considers the risk to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of 
decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk, as also set forth in the Surgeon Gen-
eral’s report . . . .  [Plaintiff’s] evidence shows he was exposed to second hand smoke al-
most 24 hours a day every day, and the defendants have not refuted that.”); Sivori, 2009 
WL 799463, at *7 (looking to a heightened standard to find objective Helling prong satis-
fied by prolonged ETS exposure for the purposes of withstanding summary judgment).  
125 Hicks, 2009 WL 2969768, at *6–7. 
126 See id. at 6 (“The court takes judicial notice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. rule 201, that the 
United States Surgeon General’s June 2006 report concluded that scientific evidence 
shows there is no safe level of or exposure to second hand smoke.  Of course, defendants 
may dispute the Surgeon General’s report and conclusions pursuant to the procedures 
set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. rule 201.”). 
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the trial stage.  If prolonged exposure can be sufficient to satisfy Hel-
ling’s objective prong on both inquiries to withstand summary judg-
ment, so should scientifically unreasonable exposure suffice to satisfy the 
objective prong in its entirety at any stage.  The adoption of the 2006 
Report provides the necessary evidence to tie together the concepts 
of unreasonable and intolerable levels of exposure. 
Indeed, tying these concepts together at either the summary 
judgment or trial stage would appear to be more judicially conserva-
tive than the approach used in the line of cases citing Hicks.  Unlike 
the reasoning used in the aforementioned cases, merging the inqui-
ries does not in itself create a heightened standard for air quality.127  
Only a showing of scientifically unreasonable exposure would obviate 
the inquiry into public tolerance.  Furthermore, the same conclusion 
drawn from the 2006 Report and inferred from surveying state laws—
that public opinion has evolved to the point where compulsory expo-
sure to unreasonable levels of ETS is not tolerated—would apply at 
all stages of litigation. 
Accordingly, upon a merger of the objective inquiries, litigation 
concerning the objective analysis of Eighth Amendment ETS expo-
sure cases would become primarily scientific and statistical.128  No 
formal inquiry into public tolerance would be made by this construc-
tion unless the defendant challenged the presumption that the pub-
lic would not tolerate the exposure in question.  The general move by 
a majority of states to restrict ETS exposure in public warrants a pre-
sumption that the public would be unwilling that anyone be exposed, 
compulsorily, to a scientifically dangerous level of ETS.  By this syn-
thesis of existing tests and standards, the analytical treatment of 
Eighth Amendment ETS exposure in prison cases would remain le-
gally consistent with the test put forth in Helling129 while becoming 
philosophically, ethically, and intuitively consonant, thereby eliminat-
ing an unintuitive evidentiary hurdle for pro se litigants in the 
process. 
 
127 Cf. Perkins, 2010 WL 5488234, at *6 (discussing and “[a]pplying the heightened standard 
as adopted vis-à-vis the Surgeon General’s Report” that the Hicks court had applied in de-
nying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
128 Cf. Helling v. Mckinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (“[D]etermining whether McKinney’s 
conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment requires more than a scientific 
and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that 
such injury to health will actually be caused by exposure to ETS.  It also requires a court 
to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave 
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a 
risk.”). 
129 Id. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
When the Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that compelled exposure 
to environmental tobacco smoke could constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, it required plaintiffs to 
show not only a scientific likelihood of harm, but also that the public 
would not tolerate the exposure at issue.130  Public opinion on the 
harmfulness of environmental tobacco smoke has changed drastically 
since that time.  In the years following Helling, state legislatures quick-
ly moved to recognize the public’s intolerance of ETS exposure by 
passing laws greatly restricting public smoking.  The resulting con-
sensus that ETS exposure is not widely tolerated in public areas131 
warrants an equally broad presumption that the public frowns upon 
compelled exposure to scientifically unreasonable amounts of ETS 
when experienced by anyone, including prisoners.132  Courts that con-
tinue to actively inquire into the social tolerance of ETS exposure fail 
to acknowledge the incredible steps taken by legislatures, in response 
to scientific advancements and shifting public opinion, to curb public 
smoking.133  Ultimately, it is untenable to hinge a prisoner’s right to a 
safe living environment on such an external, variable, and now irrele-
vant factor.  Because the scientific and public opinions of the harms 
of considerable ETS exposure have crystallized, the time has come to 
functionally dispatch with the social tolerance inquiry the Helling 
Court put forth eighteen years ago. 
 
130 Id. 
131 See Kabat, supra note 1 (compiling data on public smoking bans and arguing that expo-
sure to ETS has become presumptively intolerable). 
132 See Helling, 509 U.S. at 36 (“It also requires a court to assess whether society considers the 
risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards 
of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.”). 
133 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
